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ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND THE NOTION OF 
POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
COLIN CRAWFORD*
Environmental justice scholars have noted that, in the United 
States, there is less empirical work documenting disparities in 
environmental benefits than there is empirical study documenting 
the inequitable distribution and cumulative impact of multiple 
environmental burdens.
 
1  The fact that much less has been done 
with respect to environmental benefits is, perhaps, unsurprising.  
The distribution of parks, green space provision, and walkable 
sidewalks, along with access to coastal and water resources, to cite 
just four examples, are generally conceived of more as “land use” 
than “environmental” matters.  In the United States, land use is 
sacrosanct—it is the traditional province of local and state 
government.2
 
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Payson Center for International 
Development, Tulane University School of Law.  An early version of this Article 
was presented at the “New Perspectives on Land Development: Between 
Renewed State Interventionism and Post-Dependency” conference, held at the 
Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, in August 2008, co-sponsored by 
the Faculty of Law at the Universidad de los Andes and the Institute for Global 
Law & Policy at Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to the participants at that 
conference for their comments, as well as for those received at the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Journal of International Law Annual Symposium on the topic 
“Afro-Descendants and Indigenous Peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Legal Rights and Realities.”  Kevin Morris and Brandon Sousa provided 
invaluable and speedy research help for which I am grateful. 
  Pollution control laws, by contrast, are understood 
1 See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 328 (2002) (describing Scorecard, a website 
that compiles and publishes data on every U.S. county and allows users to 
“calculate, within a given county or state, what the distribution of [four particular 
environmental] hazards is across race, income, or other demographic or 
socioeconomic characteristics.”).  
2 For this reason, presumably, Rechtschaffen urges greater environmental 
justice action in the United States at these levels of government.  See id. at 327–28 
(discussing the comparative success of California’s Proposition 65 over the U.S. 
Toxics Release Inventory Program in reducing toxic air emissions, and also 
referencing Scorecard’s ability to link users to state regulators and local 
environmental organizations).  Of the above examples, coastal and water 
resources are the items most likely to be subject to federal regulation, creating a 
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to be more “environmental” than “land use” questions in the 
United States, at least since the 1970s.3  Thus, U.S. environmental 
law and regulatory norms emanate in the first instance from the 
federal government, even where their implementation and 
enforcement occurs at the state or, less often, at the local level.4
 
complicated maze of cross-government regulation.  See Coastal Zone Management 
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006) (creating the National Coastal Zone 
Management Program as well as the National Estuarine Research Reserve system, 
under which both federal and state law impact the use and preservation of 
resources); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251–1387 (2006) (authorizing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to 
implement and enforce measures aimed at restoring and preserving water 
resources, which include mandatory state water quality standards as well as 
funding for state and federal programs); Robin Kundis Craig, Regulation of U.S. 
Marine Resources: An Overview of the Current Complexity, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 3 (2004) (discussing the large number of federal departments and agencies 
involved in living coastal and marine resource management, as opposed to the 
regulatory split between federal and state agencies  in managing nonliving marine 
resources); Roderick E. Walston, California Water Law: Historical Origins to the 
Present, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 765 (2008) (providing an overview of the “amalgam of 
state and federal laws that establish both local and national goals in the field of 
water regulation” in California).  On the sometimes crippling consequences of the 
insistence that “land use” remain a local concern, see, for example, Richard 
Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 
254 (2002), which notes that sprawl results, in part, from conflicting self-interested 
actions by multiple localities in the same region.  See also Katharine J. Jackson, The 
Need for Regional Management of Growth: Boulder, Colorado, as a Case Study, 37 URB. 
LAW. 299 (2005) (discussing the negative effects and costs associated with urban 
sprawl that result from local land use control). 
  
The fact that most empirical work in the environmental justice area 
3 That decade saw the passage of what remain the core federal laws 
regulating pollution.  See generally Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6901–92 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 
(2006); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 88–99 (6th ed. 2009) (providing a chronology of federal environmental 
regulation and noting the decade of the 1970s has been called the “environmental 
decade” because it marked the beginning of most major federal environmental 
regulation).  
4 This sharing of responsibility for lawmaking and implementation is 
famously known as “cooperative federalism” and is typical of the environmental 
law field.  See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources 
Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005) (explaining the concept of cooperative 
federalism as well as providing a “taxonomy of cooperative federalism, as 
actually practiced in the United States”).  See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, 
supra note 1, at 328 (discussing environmental data available at the community 
level, as well as the perceived need for community activism targeted towards both 
the EPA and state regulators). 
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documents environmental burdens rather than benefits is 
therefore, to some degree at least, a reflection of the structure of 
U.S. environmental and land use law.  Early environmental justice 
cases used, unsuccessfully, theories such as Equal Protection 
challenges under the U.S. Constitution5 and, later still, theories 
such as disparate impact,6 in both cases borrowing from federal 
civil rights law.7
 
5 The cases include Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 558 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, where a neighborhood 
association alleged “racial discrimination in the siting and permitting of [a] solid 
waste landfill”); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 
Civ.A. 01-702(FLW), 2006 WL 1097498 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection, against a claim that it granted permits to operate a granulated blast 
furnace slag grinding facility in violation of Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); Cox v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-1763BH, 2004 WL 
2108253 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), aff’d, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding in 
favor of the City where plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the City failed to stop illegal dumping in violation of the Equal 
Protection clause); Boyd v. Browner, 897 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 107 F.3d 
922 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the government, 
where plaintiffs claimed that the reappraisal of property to account for 
contamination during EPA condemnation proceedings was performed in a 
racially discriminatory manner); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 
1991), aff’d without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding in favor of the 
defendants in a claim that intentional racial discrimination led to a landfill’s 
placement in a predominantly black neighborhood, where evidence presented 
shows that the site was chosen based on its central, yet remote, location); E. Bibb 
Twiggs v. Macon Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), 
aff’d 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence was insufficient to 
establish that permitting a landfill in a predominantly black neighborhood was 
motivated by race discrimination, where the only other landfill was located in a 
primarily white neighborhood); Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. 
Tex. 1979) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds 
that plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood that they would prevail in 
their claim: that the decision to grant a waste facility permit was motivated by 
racial discrimination), aff’d without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).  But see 
Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *2 (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (denying the City’s motion for summary judgment against 
plaintiffs’ claims that the City intentionally discriminated against them based on 
their race “in providing municipal services related to flood protection, zoning, 
protection from industrial nuisances, landfill practices, [and] streets and drainage 
. . . .”).  
  Thus, one can observe a “federalization” of much 
of the environmental justice discourse that, in the U.S. context at 
6 See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO 
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 34–37 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster 
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing disparate impact litigation under the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Title VI regulations).  
7 See sources cited supra notes 5 and 6. 
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least, resulted in a lack of attention to the “local” land use issues.8  
Of course, land use questions have implications well beyond the 
locale where they are made, just as pollution travels beyond state 
and local borders.9
At the analytical, if not the empirical level, this Article 
ultimately seeks to demonstrate that this distinction is a false and 
damaging one.  In the process, the Article also undertakes to 
explore a framework for thinking about environmental benefit 
provisions as part of a comprehensive environmental justice 
strategy.  That is, the argument below proceeds on the assumption 
that in addition to empirical work, it is essential to define the 
normative advantages of what this Article will call a notion of 
“positive environmental justice”—that is, of a right to 
environmental goods that can be understood to be at least as 
important as the right to be protected from environmental harms, 
which has been the central focus of most U.S. environmental justice 
activity for the last quarter century.
 
10
Following this introductory section, the Article is divided into 
three parts.  The first portion of Part 1 will chart the relatively thin 
case made in the U.S. literature for what this Article labels 
“positive environmental justice.”  The second section in Part 1 then 
looks outside the United States and analyzes an important and 
relatively recent decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court.  
The Colombian decision, which affirmed the constitutional and 
other international and domestic law rights of native and Afro-
Colombian peoples in that country to make decisions regarding the 
use and exploitation of the nation’s abundant forests,
   
11
 
8 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 327–28 (discussing efforts to 
handle environmental problems on both the state and local level, such as 
California’s Proposition 65 and the Scorecard system developed by the 
environmental group, Environmental Defense).  
 provides a 
nuanced and extensive defense of what I characterize as positive 
9 The loss of green space to suburban sprawl is an excellent example of this 
fact.  See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (detailing how the growth of 
American suburbs has influenced economic, social, and technological 
development).  
10 See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO 
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 6, at xxxiii (explaining environmental 
justice as “the idea that minority and low-income individuals, communities, and 
populations should not be disproportionately exposed to environmental 
hazards . . . .”). 
11 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Enero 23, 2008 [Jan. 23, 
2008], Sentencia C-030/08 (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional 
.gov.co/relatoria/2008/C-030-08.htm [Hereinafter Sentencia C-030/08]. 
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environmental justice.12  As such, it provides a compelling model 
for those interested in heeding the call to expand environmental 
benefits.13  Part 2 will then identify and critically evaluate 
normative advantages that can be derived from a capacious notion 
of environmental justice that seeks to secure benefits as well as 
burdens.  Part 3 will conclude, finally, with reflections on the 
consequences of doing so.  Specifically, Part 3 will argue that by 
moving towards this more capacious notion of environmental 
justice, it also will be possible to begin to erode the artificial 
distinction between “environmental” and “land use” decisions that 
so effectively impede needed changes in land use, environmental 
law, and regulation structures and institutions in the United 
States.14
1. POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 
1.1. U.S. Environmental Justice and Environmental Benefits 
Over a decade ago, one scholar predicted that “[t]he next 
frontier for both the [environmental justice] movement and the 
focus of environmental justice scholarship . . . is land use planning . 
. . .”15  That prediction, however, has not come to pass, despite the 
fact that for nearly forty years, U.S. jurisprudence has affirmed the 
right of all communities to equal municipal service provision, a 
category that surely includes parks and green space.16  As early as 
the 1930s, the prominent landscape architect Frederick Olmstead, 
Jr. set forth an ambitious park plan for the East Bay of the San 
Francisco metropolitan region, one that stressed equal space access 
and provision.17
 
12 See id. (finding that the consultation of indigenous peoples is necessary for 
any law affecting their territory because of its close ties to their communities and 
the need to respect indigenous populations). 
  Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to argue 
13 See RECHTSTAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 328–29 (arguing for more focus 
on correcting imbalances in environmental benefits, not just burdens).  
14 See id. at 327–28 (discussing information sources focused solely on negative 
environmental impacts). 
15 Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land 
Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998). 
16 See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 461 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1972) (“[W]e 
recognize the right of every citizen regardless of race to equal municipal 
services.”); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1965) (“The service 
rendered by [parks] is municipal in nature . . . . [A park] is more like a fire 
department or police department that traditionally serves the community.”).  
17 Paul Stanton Kibel, The People Down the Hill: Parks Equity in San Francisco’s 
East Bay, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 354 (2007) (noting that with 
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that this vision has taken hold as an organizing principle at the 
national level; the provision of green space varies widely by 
region.18
To be sure, at the state and local level, there are some notable 
exceptions, particularly in California.  In the political sphere, for 
example, during his successful 2006 campaign, Los Angeles Mayor 
Antonio Villaraigosa announced his “Building Parks for Everyone” 
plan, in which he announced his view that Los Angeles “needs 
many more large and small parks.  Ideally [Los Angeles] should 
have small parks and open space areas no more than a mile walk 
away for anyone in the city.”
   
19  Efforts in the Los Angeles area to 
transform neglected or blighted areas into parks have occurred at 
the local community activist and regulatory levels as well.20  Other 
jurisdictions have detailed land use planning tools that focus on 
widespread provision of green space.  For example, in 2005, 
Georgia passed the Georgia Land Conservation Act that 
established a statewide conservation program designed to preserve 
the state’s land resources by emphasizing partnerships between all 
levels of government and the private sector.21  The Land 
Conservation Act did not, however, emphasize social equity in the 
allocation of conservation land.22
 
widespread ownership of cars it became “possible for a large portion of the 
population to spend many leisure hours in the country . . . .”). 
 
18 See, e.g., TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, TOTAL PARKLAND AS PERCENT OF CITY LAND 
AREA (2008) (comparing park acres as a percent of land area for several U.S. cities 
throughout the country). 
19 Kibel, supra note 17, at 339.  
20 See Heather Barnett, The Chinatown Cornfields: Including Environmental 
Benefits in Environmental Justice Struggles, 8 CRITICAL PLAN. 50, 51 (2001) 
(recounting development efforts and demands for environmental justice in Los 
Angeles’ Chinatown); Robert García & Aubrey White, Warren County’s Legacy for 
Healthy Parks, Schools And Communities: From the Cornfield to El Congreso and 
Beyond, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 127 (2007) (tracing the development of 
environmental justice movements and provisions for green space following the 
Chinatown Cornfield efforts); Robert García et al., Healthy Children, Healthy 
Communities: Schools, Parks, Recreation, and Sustainable Regional Planning, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1267 (2004) (linking lack of adequate open space in urban 
areas to rising childhood obesity rates); Paul Stanton Kibel, Los Angeles’ Cornfield: 
An Old Blueprint for New Greenspace, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 275, 277 (2004) (detailing 
how the vacant “Cornfield” of Los Angeles will be made into a public park).  
21 See Press Release, State of Georgia Office of the Governor, Landmark 
Georgia Land Conservation Act Becomes Law (Apr. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,78006749_79688147_93023024,0
0.html (describing $100 million loan fund with state, federal and private funds). 
22 See GA. CODE ANN. § 12–6A–1 (2010) (making no mention of the allocation 
of conservation land). 
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The academic literature on equitable provision of green space 
and “positive” environmental benefits is not much more extensive 
than the literature already cited above.23  Of the few useful studies 
that exist, most come from practitioners and activists rather than 
scholars.24  Government-sponsored studies are equally few and far 
between.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency contracted 
the National Academy of Public Administration to prepare a report 
in July 2003 that examined the land use-environmental justice 
nexus.25  In sum, while sometimes useful, these scattered studies, 
commentaries, and analyses do not amount to a focused and 
coherent defense of what this Article labels the “positive concept of 
environmental justice.”26
1.2. The Colombian Forestry Law Case 
  For this reason, Decision C-080 of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, which struck down the then-
extant forestry law, merits special attention. 
Of Colombia’s legal industries, forestry ranks among the most 
important.27
 
23 See, e.g., Peter Harnik & Jeff Simms, Parks: How Far Is Too Far, PLANNING, 
Dec. 2004, at 8–9 (discussing the importance of proximity for park access and the 
lack of major U.S. cities that take it into account); Deborah Keeth, Book Note, 
Wilderness as a Matter of Environmental Justice, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 209, 209 (2004) 
(reviewing JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND 
APPLICATIONS (Kathryn M. Mutz et al., eds., 2002)); Patricia Salkin, Intersection 
Between Environmental Justice and Land Use Planning, 56 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., 5–7 
(2006) (surveying land use tools that can be put to the service of environmental 
and land use justice). 
  Logically enough, in light of the industry’s 
24 See García et al., supra note 20, at 1267 (linking lack of adequate open space 
in urban areas to rising childhood obesity rates); Kibel, supra note 17, at 335 
(inquiring whether the differential access to East Bay Parks might be due to 
environmental racism); BAY AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, PARKS PEOPLE AND 
CHANGE: ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PARKS, RECREATION AND OPEN 
SPACE CONSERVATION IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 43 (2004) (reporting 
observations collected from various public agencies and land conservation 
organizations); CHONA SISTER ET AL., ACCESS TO PARKS AND PARK FACILITIES IN THE 
GREEN VISIONS PLAN REGION 3 (2008), available at http://www.greenvisionsplan 
.net/html/documents/17_access_parks_and_park_facilities_in_the_green_visions
_plan_region_081508.pdf (detailing “access to and equity in the distribution of 
park and open space resources” in parts of southern California).  
25 See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ADDRESSING COMMUNITY 
CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE PLANNING AND 
ZONING (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources 
/reports/annual-project-reports/napa-land-use-zoning-63003.pdf. 
26 See Keeth, supra note 23, at 214–17 (detailing how environmental justice is 
integral to effective administration of public policies and programs).  
27 The CIA World Factbook reports that agricultural occupations account for 
18% of the labor force and, of agricultural products, forestry products are the 11th 
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importance and value to the nation, in 2006 the country enacted a 
general forestry law:  “[t]he present law intends to establish the 
National Forest Plan . . . .  To this end, the law establishes the 
necessary organization by the State to regulate activities related to 
natural forests and forest plantations.”28  These include not only 
“the conservation and sustainable management of [the country’s] 
natural forests and forest plantations in soils dedicated to forest 
use,”29
[A]ll public institutions of the country that participate in 
development of the forest sector, the norms, strategies and 
national policies of the said Plan, with the aim to guarantee 
the organic character [literally, the “organicity”] and 
coherence required as an essential condition to provide for 
sustainable investment and growth in the forest sector, 
including that by economic agents and forestry actors in 
general, [by means of] a clear, universal and legally secure 
framework.  Said provision operates without prejudice to 
the autonomy and powers accorded by law to the 
environmental and territorial authorities, as well as 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.”
 but also the following provision, one that appears on its 
face to commit the country to what can only be understood as a 
broad-based commitment to environmental justice regarding forest 
use: 
30
 
most important.  U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2011), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos 
/co.html (follow “Economy: Columbia”).  
  
28 Ley 1021 de 2006, abril 24, 2006 Diario Oficial [D.O.] 46.249, art. 1 (Colom.), 
available at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2006 
/ley_1021_2006.html (“La presente ley tiene por objeto establecer el Régimen 
Forestal Nacional . . . . A tal efecto, la ley establece la organización administrativa 
necesaria del Estado y regula las actividades relacionadas con los bosques 
naturales y las plantaciones forestales.”). 
29 Id. art. 2, § 1 (“[L]a conservación y el manejo sostenible de sus bosques 
naturales y el establecimiento de plantaciones forestales en suelos con vocación 
forestal . . . .”).  
30 Id. art. 2, § 2. 
[T]odas las instituciones públicas del país que participen en el desarrollo 
del sector forestal, a las normas, estrategias y políticas nacionales de 
dicho Régimen, en la perspectiva de garantizar la organicidad y la 
coherencia requeridas como condición esencial para propiciar la 
inversión sostenida y creciente en el sector forestal, brindando a los 
agentes económicos y actores forestales en general, un marco claro y 
universal de seguridad jurídica.  Dicha cláusula opera sin perjuicio de las 
autonomías y potestades acordadas por la ley a las autoridades 
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Moreover, the Forestry Law created the National Forest 
Council, which included not only representatives of government, 
industry, and universities, but also representatives of indigenous 
groups and Afro-Colombian communities.31  However, these steps 
were not enough to rescue the Forestry Law from a successful 
constitutional claim challenging its failure to substantively serve 
the interests of Colombian racial and ethnic minority groups.32
1.2.1. The Legal Challenge 
 
In August of 2006, the Public Interest Law Group at the 
University of the Andes in Bogotá (“G-DIP”)33 formed an alliance 
with an inter-American environmental group to challenge the 
General Forestry Law as unconstitutional.34  In the first semester of 
2007, G-DIP filed a complaint in Colombia’s Constitutional Court35 
challenging the constitutionality of the Forestry Law.36
 
ambientales y territoriales, así como a las comunidades indígenas y 
afrocolombianas. 
  For those 
Id. 
31 Id. tit. I, ch. 1, art. 7 (listing in detail the diverse membership of the 
National Forest Council broken down by representation, which notably includes 
members of indigenous groups as part of the body).  
32 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (declaring the Forestry Law to be 
unconstitutional based on the legislature’s failure to consult indigenous 
communities and people of African descent during the process of drafting and 
enacting the law).  
33 “G-DIP” is a Spanish acronym for “Grupo de Derecho de Interés Público.”  
See Grupo de Derecho de Interés Público, http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2011) (emphasizing the groups goals to connect the university with 
society, increase focus on legal education in Colombia, and solve structural 
problems of society using the law, particularly those problems affecting 
vulnerable communities).  
34 The group was the Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del 
Ambiente.  See G-DIP—Lineas de Trabajo, http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co 
/interno.php?Id=6&Menu=10&lang=es (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (detailing how 
the partnership attacked the General Forestry Law on the grounds that it did not 
promote sustainable development and was enacted without the consultation of 
indigenous peoples).  
35 See generally Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional 
Courts: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 186–89 
(2009) (discussing the formation and functionality of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and concluding that its method of judicial appointment, 
jurisdiction over matters involving the violation of ordinary citizens’ fundamental 
rights, and practical perspective on how those rights should be understood have 
helped it develop into a “powerful guardian of constitutional rights”).  
36 Demanda de inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley 1021 de 2006 o Ley General 
Forestal [hereinafter Complaint], available at http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co 
/leyforestal.html.  Although four lawyers associated with G-DIP were the 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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interested in environmental protection and sustainable 
environmental management practices, as well as for those 
committed to the goals of the environmental justice movement, the 
complaint (and the decision to which it led) is a document of 
special interest because of its conceptual breadth.37  That is, 
perhaps reflecting the complaint’s genesis in a clinic devoted to 
constitutional matters, it does not make its case in mere reliance 
upon environmental statutes and regulations.  On the contrary, the 
complaint looks to a broad range of Colombian legal rights—some 
with origin in Colombian ratification of international 
agreements38
The central claim of the complaint rests upon the premise that 
the forestry law failed “for not having realized a prior consult [a 
form of public hearing] with either indigenous communities or 
Afro-descendent communities during the process of drafting the 
legislative initiative that let to the passage of Law 1021 of 2006.”
—based on equality principles. 
39
 
principal plaintiffs, they were supported in their action by other organizations like 
the Friends of the Earth Colombia and Asociación Centro Nacional Salud, 
Ambiente y Trabajo (CENSAT Agua Viva).  See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L, 
SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2009), available at http://www.foei.org/en 
/resources/publications/annual-report/2008/what-we-achieved-in-2008 
/member-groups (follow “Latin America and the Caribbean” hyperlink; then 
follow “Colombia: Court Overturns Controversial Forestry Law” hyperlink) 
(describing Friends of the Earth Colombia’s and CENSAT Agua Viva’s opposition 
to the General Forestry Law and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s 
subsequent finding that the law was unconstitutional).  Some of the points 
advanced here with respect to the complaint and subsequent decision were first 
explored in Colin Crawford, Derechos culturales y justicia ambiental: lecciones del 
modelo colombiano, in JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, MEDIO AMBIENTE Y DEMOCRACIA 
PARTICIPATIVA 27, 42–61 (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, ed., 2010) [Hereinafter 
JUSTICIA COLECTIVA]. 
  
The specific procedural error alleged by the complaint was a 
failure to recognize Colombian international treaty obligations, 
specifically International Labour Organization (“ILO”) Convention 
37 See generally Complaint, supra note 36 (raising arguments based in 
international treaty obligations, constitutional protection of pluralism, 
constitutional minority rights protections, in addition to the Forestry Law’s own 
provisions). 
38 Id. at 21–27 (discussing the constitutional provisions violated by the 
Forestry Law and focusing especially on Article 6 of the ILO Convention 169 
which requires legislatures to consult with indigenous peoples when formulating 
laws which will affect them—this provision has been incorporated into 
Colombia’s constitution).  
39 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 100, available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html.  
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169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples.40  ILO 
Convention 169 creates the duty to “consult the peoples concerned, 
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their 
representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given 
to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them 
directly.”41  This step is extraordinary compared to U.S. practice; to 
put it mildly, reliance upon treaty obligations as a means to secure 
domestic rights is a controversial practice in the United States,42 to 
say nothing of the use of foreign law, which continues to prove 
deeply contentious.43  But in Colombia, according to the complaint, 
a violation of ILO Convention 169 was tantamount to a 
constitutional violation since the treaty duty was part of the 
“constitutional bloc,”44 including ILO Convention 169 duties to 
observe this and other treaty commitments, like rights of self-
determination (Article 9) and, more generally, human rights 
obligations (Article 93).45
 
40 Int’l Labour Org., Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, 28 I.L.M. (1989), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm 
(framing the international standards for recognizing the rights of Indigenous and 
Tribal people). 
  However, by itself, this argument might 
41 Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
42 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) 
(No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875, at *30 (“The long-established presumption is that 
treaties and other international agreements do not create judicially enforceable 
rights.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
11, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566), 2006 
WL 271823, at *11 [hereinafter Gov’t Sanchez-Llamas Brief] (arguing that 
international agreements are generally presumed not to confer judicially 
enforceable individual rights); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually 
Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-
Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20 (2007) (noting that in both the Sanchez-
Llamas and Hamdan cases, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided a direct answer to this 
issue, and providing a preliminary framework for thinking about introducing a 
doctrinal innovation that would address the enforcement of rights created by 
treaty).  
43 Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 28, 
2008, at 50–57, 66, 70 (discussing the ongoing debate within the Supreme Court as 
to how international law should interact with the U.S. system, and pointing out 
the impact Supreme Court decisions have on the country’s international policies).  
44 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 36, at 36 (stating that under Colombian law, 
Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 expanded the rights granted in Article 330 of the 
Colombian Constitution, making violation of the treaty provisions a violation of 
constitutional law).  
45 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 9, 93, 
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html 
(recognizing the right to self determination as one of the three tenets of state 
foreign relations, and stating that constitutional rights are construed according to 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
CRAWFORD.DOC 3/18/2011  3:15 PM 
922 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
not have held.  The protections offered by Articles 9 and 93 are 
only general.46  The “human rights” to which Article 93 refers, for 
example, are not specified.47  Moreover, the two articles do not 
relate to either the particular context of the Colombian forestry law 
or to the interests of traditional communities, whether indigenous 
or Afro-Colombian.48
The constitutional rights to which the complaint referred were 
of two types.  The first type protects rights enjoyed by all members 
of Colombian society.  Articles 1, 2, and 3 articulate the aspirational 
character of the Colombian democracy and in particular provide 
that it is to be both pluralistic and participatory.
  The complaint’s next argument cleverly 
links the treaty commitments to existing Colombian minority 
rights, specifically to more detailed rights articulated in the 
Constitution itself. 
49  The second type, 
by contrast, provides specific protection of minority rights.  Article 
7 refers to a particular feature of Colombian pluralism, namely a 
commitment to “ethnic and cultural pluralism.”50  Article 13 
commits to protect groups that suffer from discrimination or have 
otherwise been marginalized in Colombian society,51 while Article 
330 entitles indigenous people to the right to self-determination in 
the exploitation of natural resources within their lands.52
A less thoughtful argument might have only focused on Article 
330 as a means to invalidate the Colombian forestry law.  Article 
330 is the most concrete of all the cited provisions, and, at least on 
its face, would appear to demand the forestry law’s reformulation 
to the extent that it implicated the use of forests within indigenous 
lands.  But the complaint cleverly juxtaposed its claims, suggesting 
that the goal of a pluralistic society that respects minority rights 
 
 
human rights treaties to which Colombia is a party); see also Complaint, supra note 
36, at 28 (stating that Convention 169 was Colombian law regardless of whether 
there were statutory provisions implementing it).  
46 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, supra note 45, art. 93 (referring 
generally to “treaties and conventions ratified by the Congress”). 
47 See id. art. 93 (referring generally to “the human rights treaties ratified by 
Columbia”). 
48 Id. 
49 See id. arts. 1–3 (setting forth constitutional principles of territorial 
sovereignty within the state, democracy, equal protection of law, and personal 
liberty). 
50 Id. art. 7. 
51 Id. art. 13. 
52 See id. art. 330 (outlining the administrative functions and principles of 
government to be used by political councils governing indigenous territories). 
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should be measured not only by internal legal obligations to equal 
protection but also by international ones.53
These equal protection commitments are then paired with 
specific minority entitlements, namely the self-determination of 
resource use by indigenous people.
 
54  Thus, the complaint 
implicitly made the case—by virtue of its juxtaposition and 
accumulation of constitutional protections—that the Colombian 
Constitution centrally and fundamentally commits the nation to 
minority protection, not just in isolated articles but also throughout 
its text.  Moreover, the complaint urged the Court to apply the 
widest possible definition of environmental justice, meaning one 
that allows for special minority protections while also protecting 
the environmental rights of all citizens.55  All Colombians need be 
considered, the complaint suggested, when national natural 
resources were at stake:  “[t]he Court should recognize as 
beneficiaries of the prior hearing not only those in indigenous 
lands but also Afro-descendents.  In equal manner, the object of the 
duty was expanded, such that it is not limited . . . but also to 
extend to all of those susceptible to being directlty affected [by the 
decisions].”56
1.2.2. The Constitutional Court Decision 
 
Article 79 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 guarantees 
that “all people have the right to a healthy environment.  The law 
will guarantee the participation of communities in decisions that 
 
53 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 32 (noting that national and international 
measures are relevant in examining the obligations that the state has to 
indigenous people). 
54 See id. at 22–23 (summarizing the relevant provisions of the constitution 
that point to the right of indigenous people to determine how resources within 
their territories are used).  
55 See id. at 29 (urging the constitutional court to make it mandatory for 
indigenous people to be involved in the allocation of their natural resources and 
to do so according to the customs of each ethnic group). 
56 JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, supra note 36, at 221. 
Se reconocieron como beneficiarios del derecho a la consulta previa [de 
medidas legislativas] no sólo a los territorios indígenas sino también a 
los afrodescendientes.  En igual sentido, el objeto de la obligación de 
realizar consulta fue ampliado, toda vez que ya no se limita a las 
decisiones sobre explotación de recursos naturales, sino que se extiende a 
todas aquellas susceptibles de afectarlos directamente. 
Id.  This quotation comes from the part of the decision in which the Court 
reiterated the parties’ arguments in the civil law fashion.  
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may affect them.”57  Yet interestingly, the Constitutional Court did 
not rely upon Article 79 for its decision that the national forestry 
law could not stand.  Instead, the Court’s opinion endorses 
environmental justice principles while not basing the claim upon a 
legal right or obligation specifically identified in an environmental 
or natural resource law or regulation.58
In the press release announcing the decision, the Court 
declared that in its decision “the Court reiterates the line of 
jurisprudence traced in material that recognizes ethnic and cultural 
diversity as a constitutional principle and foundation of Colombian 
nationality.”
  That is, it can be said to 
endorse a view of positive environmental justice, one that argues 
for equality in access to and control over a clean environment as 
among those things that constitute a just society. 
59  As the Court’s decision further clarified, this 
reasoning is constitutionally required under constitutional Articles 
1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 93 and 330.60  As the press release and the decision 
itself went on to explain, this conclusion was compelled because 
Colombia must be understood “as a democratic, participatory and 
pluralistic State.”61
Given the context, this must be judged as an environmental 
justice victory of the highest order, linking, as it does, equality 
principles and environmental management decisions.  In fact, 
Colombia’s population is, in absolute numbers, not especially 
diverse.  Although census and other survey classifications of race 
and ethnicity are problematic because they typically rely upon self-
 
 
57 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, supra note 45, art. 79 (providing 
that the law guarantees the participation of the communities “[t]odas las personas 
tienen derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano.  La ley garantizará la participación 
de la comunidad en las decisiones que puedan afectarlo.”).  
58 See generally Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (discussing the procedural 
defects and omissions in the court’s opinion that affect the materiality of the legal 
right of indigenous communities to consultation in the formation of forestry law).  
59 See Press Release, Republica de Colombia Corte Constitutional, 
Comunicado de Prensa No. 1 de 23 de enero de 2008 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co/leyforestal.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) 
(highlighting the court’s acknowledgement that the constitution requires that 
special consideration be given to ethnic and cultural diversity in jurisprudence—
“La Corte reiteró la línea jurisprudencial trazada en materia de reconocimiento de 
la diversidad étnica y cultural como principio constitucional y fundamento de la 
nacionalidad colombiana.”).  
60 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11 (premising the court’s line of 
reasoning on the text of the constitution).  
61 See Press Release, supra note 59 (explaining that there is a constitutional 
duty imposed on the judiciary by article 1 that compels the result); See, e.g., 
JUSTICIA COLECTIVA, supra note 36, at 276–77.  
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reporting and so responses often reflect cultural and social 
stereotypes, it is at least true to say that, comparatively speaking, 
the ethnic and racial populations constitute a relatively small 
percentage of the Colombian population.  Indigenous people 
constitute but 1.75% of the national population, while the Afro-
Colombian population represents approximately 12% of the 
population.62  By contrast, elsewhere in the continent the 
indigenous population is much more significant:  55% in Bolivia,63 
25% in Ecuador,64 and 45% in Peru.65  Brazil, like Colombia a 
country with extensive forests traditionally the home of indigenous 
people and also a country whose history was marked by the 
African slave trade, has an official Afro-Brazilian population of 
44.7%.66  The United States, like Brazil a nation of near-continental 
dimensions once dominated by indigenous people, and also a 
country shaped by the African slave trade, reports official statistics 
comparable to Colombia’s composition.  The United States has an 
official indigenous population of but 1.15%; African-Americans 
constitute 12.85% of the official national total.67  Nevertheless, the 
Columbian Court accepted the claim advanced in G-DIP’s 
complaint that the actual population percentage had 
disproportionate influence over management of the resource.68  
The Court recognized that the lands of indigenous peoples and 
Afro-descendents constituted fully 32.2% of the national territory 
overall—not an inconsequential fraction.69
 
62 DANIEL BONILLA MALDONADO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN MULTICULTURAL 26 (2006).  
  Moreover, in defined 
63 See U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Field Listing—Ethnic Groups, 2008 
WORLD FACTBOOK, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2075.html (reporting that of the indigenous population in 
Bolivia, 30% are Quechua, 25% are Aymara, and another 25% are classified as 
mestizo, meaning of mixed white and Amerindian ancestry).  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 See INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, 2000 BRAZIL CENSUS 
available at 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/populacao/co
r_raca_Censo2000.pdf (providing population statistics from the 2000 census). 
67 See U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, supra note 63 (providing the actual 
count of ethnic populations in the United States from 2000-2007); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 
2005 (2005) (detailing the Hispanic component of the United States’ ethnic 
population). 
68 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.1 (detailing the court’s reasoning 
and analysis on the right of participation of indigenous communities).  
69 Id.; cf. Complaint, supra note 36, at 30. (quantifying the fraction of land 
inhabited by Afro-descendents).  
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regions of Colombia, the percentage was much higher, further 
strengthening the case.70
In other words, the Constitutional Court’s decision represents a 
commitment to a diverse and pluralistic society where one might 
have thought that, by the absolute numbers, it least mattered.  
Thus, the decision affirms a principle defending the rights of a 
minority group, no matter how small, as a reflection of a nation’s 
deepest values.  It further articulates a commitment to diversity 
because of the importance of preserving the traditions, practices, 
and cultures that help define a nation.  In this, too, the decision 
ought to be read as an important articulation of environmental 
justice principles, since affirmation of the principle of respect for 
minority rights is framed in terms of a question of access to natural 
resources with implications for environmental management and 
protection. 
 
In fact, the Court endorsed the arguments of the G-DIP and 
affiliated plaintiffs in nearly every respect.  It thus held that the 
forestry law “should have been submitted to a consult process with 
indigenous and tribal communities prior to its passage.”71
 
70 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.1 (detailing the fractions of 
national territory controlled by ethnic populations).  
  
Moreover, as the Court clarified, “to establish in what sense the 
Por un lado, el carácter general e integral de la ley hace que resulte 
imposible excluir de su ámbito de aplicación a las comunidades 
indígenas y tribales, a las cuales, según documentos oficiales, se las ha 
hecho entrega formal de un total de 36,336.807 hectáreas de tierras, lo 
que representa el 32.2% del área total nacional, si se tiene en cuenta, 
además, que, de acuerdo con el informe de ponencia para segundo de 
debate del Proyecto de Ley Forestal en la plenaria del Senado de la 
República, [d]el área cubierta en bosque natural; en el Pacífico y la 
Amazonia, cerca del 41.6% pertenece a comunidades indígenas y 
afrocolombianas.  De hecho el 72% de los territorios de los resguardos 
indígenas, es decir 22.5 millones de hectáreas, coinciden con áreas 
boscosas; por su parte, del 69.4% de las tierras adjudicadas a 
comunidades afrocolombianas, cerca de 2.6 millones de hectáreas cubren 
áreas boscosas.  Estas comunidades dependen casi en su totalidad de los 
recursos que le proveen los bisques.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
71 Id., pt. VI, ¶ 5.1. 
Tal como se ha señalado, en este caso el problema de constitucionalidad 
que le ha sido planteado a la Corte conduce a establecer, en primer lugar, 
si la Ley 1021 de 2006, o Ley General Forestal, debía haber sido sometida 
a un proceso de consulta con las comunidades indígenas y tribales 
previamente a su expedición. 
Id. 
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forestry law contained an obligation to consult, it is necessary to 
attend to the controversy that occurred from the moment that the 
initiative was presented to Congress,” because those changes 
implicated the very tribal and indigenous interests affected by the 
proposal.72  This is further striking in that the Court thus makes 
clear that a prior consult in environmental decisions (or, for that 
matter, other administrative decisions where a consult is required) 
is not a pro forma activity to be conducted at the end of a matter, 
but one based upon a robust notion of inclusion, in which 
stakeholder participation is valued because it is understood that 
involvement from the beginning of a process is different than a 
formal nod to airing of complaints and concerns once a project is 
nearly ready for signature.  Furthermore, the Court endorsed the 
suggestion that the consult was compelled, at least in part, by the 
obligations of ILO Convention 169.73
The complaint advanced the notion, accepted by the Court, that 
the appropriate process for the prior consult would be distinctive 
in three crucial respects.  First, it would be understood as both 
necessary and obligatory at the legislative level.
 
74  That is, a prior 
consult is required for any legislation affecting ethnic and minority 
communities.  Decision C-030 confirms this requirement for a 
legislative consult is terribly important. It reflects the Court’s 
understanding that a pluralistic democracy requires public 
participation at the earliest possible stage, rather than, for example, 
immediately prior to the issuance of a regulatory norm by an 
executive branch agency, as is typically the case, for example, in 
the United States.75
 
72 Id.  In full, the explanation reads:  
 
[P]ara establecer si en relación con la ley forestal existía un deber de 
consulta, es preciso atender a la controversia que se suscitó desde el 
momento mismo en el que se presentó la iniciativa a la consideración del 
Congreso, porque muchas de las modificaciones que se le introdujeron a 
lo largo del debate serían indicativo de que los temas sobre los que 
versaba el proyecto comprometían aspectos que afectaban directamente 
a las entidades tribales que son titulares del derecho de consulta. 
Id. 
73 Id. (“El debate sobre tales materias se adelantó, sin embargo, sin que se 
hubiesen cumplido los presupuestos para la consulta a los pueblos indígenas y 
tribales en los términos del Convenio 169 de la OIT.”). 
74 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 36–40 (asserting that the legislature should 
be required to consult with affected groups during the entire process of drafting 
relevant bills). 
75 THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 187–90. 
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Second, and equally radical in potential scope, the complaint 
urged the Court to acknowledge that this consult would be 
required not just for direct effects on indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities.76  On the contrary, it would, the 
petitioners argued, apply to any exploitation of national forests.77
Third, the Court helped articulate a notion of positive 
environmental justice when it supported the early, broad, and deep 
inclusion of affected communities because of the environmental 
imperative, noting that Colombian forests contained nearly 10% of 
global biodiversity.
 
78
2. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR A BROAD, PLURALISTIC VISION OF 
POSITIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 
It merits asking, then, what makes Decision C-080 of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court useful beyond the confines of its 
particular case.  What makes the case special for one wishing to 
make the normative case for positive environmental justice?  First, 
the fact that the decision locates the basis for its argument in the 
national constitution, a foundational document, is a fact that 
cannot be undervalued.  As the frustrated story of U.S. attempts to 
secure environmental justice claims in terms of the Equal 
Protection Clause demonstrate,79 this is not necessarily an easy 
matter.  That is, despite the common criticism of post-colonial 
constitutions as “overflowing with promise”—and promises that 
cannot be kept80
 
76 See Complaint, supra note 36, at 30–33 (arguing that the close ties between 
the identities of indigenous groups and their territories requires their consultation 
in all matters affecting the territory, even if the effects are indirect ones). 
—Decision C-080 affirms the value of giving the 
77 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, pt. III. 
[S]e reconocieron como beneficiarios del derecho a la consulta previa [de 
medidas legislativas] no solo a los territorios indígenas sino también a 
los afrodescendientes.  En igual sentido, el objeto de la obligación de 
realizar consulta fue ampliado, toda vez que ya no se limita a las 
decisiones sobre explotación de recursos naturales, sino que se extiende a 
todas aquéllas susceptibles de afectarlos directamente. 
Id. 
78 Id. pt. VI, ¶ 5.1 (discussing the biodiversity found in the region); see also 
Complaint, supra note 36, at 30 (outlining the composition of the Colombian 
forests).  In fact, more recent U.N. estimates put the figure at 14%. 
79 See supra note 5 (providing cases in which environmental justice claims 
were brought unsuccessfully under the Equal Protection Clause). 
80 See DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST: THE 
POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) (reporting mixed conclusions on 
the successful implementation of the Bolivian and Colombian constitutions).  Van 
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environment constitutional protection that can be reinforced with 
subsequent articulation by other governmental branches. 
Second, Decision C-080 can be considered a triumph of legal 
pluralism in light of the manner in which it celebrates Colombia as 
a diverse state.  For example, at the beginning of the opinion, the 
Court demonstrated its sympathy for arguments framed by some 
of the petitioners and their supporters in the case.81  The Court thus 
stated its understanding that the forestry law, because of its non-
inclusive drafting, resulted in the following situation:  “the 
regulation of native forests . . . with a criterion that gave primacy to 
extraction over ecology, affect[ing] in a clear and direct way the 
said [indigenous and Afro-descendent] communities.”82
 
Cott notes numerous paradoxes, for example, while “constitution-makers [in both 
countries] believed that their constitutional reforms would legitimate democratic 
institutions and that this would lead to increased voter registration and reduced 
abstention. . . .  In Colombia, voter abstention actually increased after 1991[,]” as it 
did in Bolivia.  At the same time, “in both countries the indigenous population 
increased its levels of registration and voting.”  Id. at 224.  Van Cott further 
reports complaints from some elders of indigenous groups in Colombia that “new 
political openings have resulted in conflict between older [political] authorities 
and younger political officeholders, resulting in community fragmentation and a 
decline in the value of traditional authority.”  Id. at 240.  Van Cott also notes that 
“[o]bservers point out a basic contradiction between the emphasis of the 1991 
Constitution on improving the quality of democracy and the neoliberal economic 
reform that accompanied the charter’s implementation . . . .  The extreme 
inequality in the distribution of resources impedes the disempowered majority 
from exercising their new rights to participation.”  Id. at 248;  see also, Laurie 
Goering, Venezuela’s Draft Constitution is Overflowing With Promise, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
14, 1999, at 6 (discussing the lengthy Venezuelan constitution and presenting 
some of its major criticisms); Monte Reel, South America’s Constitutional Battles: As 
Three Leaders Attempt to Reshape Power, One Question is Central: Who Would Benefit?, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at A12 (considering efforts to rewrite the constitutions 
of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to reflect “21st-century socialism” and the 
resulting political backlash). 
  This 
situation, as the previous section makes clear, was unacceptable.  
What is key here is the recognition that traditional communities 
81 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, pt. VI, ¶ 2 (acknowledging the 
support groups that contributed to the claim that the issuance of law 1021 of 2006 
omitted the constitutional requirement of consultation with indigenous and Afro-
descendant communities). 
82 See id. 
[C]onsulta que era imperativa a la luz de nuestro ordenamiento 
constitucional, debido a que la ley general forestal, particularmente en 
cuanto regula los bosques nativos, y lo hace, además, con un criterio en 
el que prima lo extractivo sobre lo ecológico afecta de manera clara y 
directa a dichas comunidades. 
Id. 
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have knowledge over an activity (here, forest management) that is 
rooted in a different set of values than those that predominate in 
the extractive capitalist model. 
Third, one cannot underestimate the value of linking national 
law to a powerful, detailed international instrument that is widely 
admired like ILO Convention 169.83
a new understanding of the situation of indigenous and 
tribal peoples in all regions of the world, such that it was 
necessary to eliminate the tendency favoring assimilation to 
which they had been led, and instead, in its place, to 
establish a principle that would conform to the structures 
and forms of life of indigenous and tribal peoples as 
permanent and durable, and [that] the international 
community would have interest in the intrinsic value of 
these communities to be saved.
  Further on in the opinion, the 
Court thus clearly makes reference to the utility of arguments 
based upon ILO Convention 169, which demonstrate, the Court 
observes: 
84
 
83 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–49 (2d. 
ed. 2004) (recognizing that Convention No. 169 can be viewed as both “a 
manifestation of the movement toward responsiveness to indigenous peoples’ 
demands through international law and . . . the tension inherent in that 
movement” but concluding that the convention was ultimately successful “in 
affirming the value of indigenous communities and cultures . . . .”).  See generally 
Russel Lawrence Barsh, An Advocate’s Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209 (1990) (discussing the rights advanced 
by Convention No. 169 and urging advocates for indigenous rights to broadly 
interpret and promote the convention’s provisions); Lee Swepston, A New Step in 
the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 
1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677 (1990) (considering the advances made by 
Convention No. 169 in recognizing the existence and rights of indigenous peoples 
and encouraging ratification).  See also Jeremy Valeriote, Chile’s Supreme Court 
Upholds Indigenous Water Use Rights, SANTIAGO TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009 (describing a 
similar first application of the ILO Convention 169 by the Chilean Supreme Court 
to protect tribal water rights in a conflict between Aymara tribes and a company 
seeking to bottle and sell a freshwater source the tribe historically relied upon).  
 
84 Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11. 
[E]l Convenio 169 de la OIT fue adoptado con base en una nueva 
aproximación a la situación de los pueblos indígenas y tribales en todas 
las regiones del mundo, conforme a la cual era preciso eliminar la 
orientación hacia la asimilación que se había venido manejando, para, en 
su lugar, asentar el principio conforme al cual las estructuras y formas de 
vida de los pueblos indígenas y tribales son permanentes y perdurables, 
y la comunidad internacional tiene interés en que el valor intrínseco de 
sus culturas sea salvaguardado. 
Id. pt. VI, ¶ 4.2. 
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 Importantly, moreover, for the Court, this is not merely a 
matter of compliance with international obligations.  It thus 
demonstrates its sympathy for the view that it is the obligation of 
the State not only to secure the standard range of political and civil 
rights characteristic of modern democracies, but also “freely to 
articulate, with State support, for the promotion of their 
associational interests that have as their object the formation of 
democratic mechanisms of representation in different types of 
participation . . . .”85
Fourth, Decision C-080 stands as an early, broad, and deep 
endorsement of public participation for access to positive 
environmental benefits poised to further the aims of environmental 
protection and community resource access, particularly for 
indigenous and Afro-descendent minority communities.  With 
respect specifically to “the measures that may be susceptible 
directly to affect indigenous and tribal peoples,” the Court 
affirmed that it “has said that this is a direct consequence of the 
right of native communities to decide the priorities in their process 
of development and cultural preservation” such that the public 
consult is a legal means for the “defense of identity and cultural 
integrity and its status as a participatory mechanism.”
  Once again, what is striking from an 
environmental justice perspective is the linkage—or perhaps, 
better said, the juxtaposition—of three separate but related 
concerns:  democratic participation, cultural inclusion, and 
different methods of responding to and interacting with the 
physical environment. 
86
 
85 Id. ¶ 4.2.1 (“[D]e articularse libremente, con el apoyo del Estado, para la 
promoción de sus intereses, en asociaciones que tengan por objeto constituir 
mecanismos democráticos de representación en las diferentes instancias de 
participación, concertación, control y vigilancia de la gestión pública que se 
establezcan.”). 
  One could 
hardly wish for a clearer endorsement of a functional role for a 
86 Id. ¶ 4.2.2. 
En relación con el deber de consulta de las medidas que sean 
susceptibles de afectar directamente a los pueblos indígenas y tribales, la 
Corte ha dicho que el mismo es consecuencia directa del derecho que les 
asiste a las comunidades nativas de decidir las prioridades en su proceso 
de desarrollo y preservación de la cultura y que, cuando procede ese 
deber de consulta, surge para las comunidades un derecho fundamental 
susceptible de protección por la vía de la acción de tutela, en razón a la 
importancia política del mismo, a su significación para la defensa de la 
identidad e integridad cultural y a su condición de mecanismo de 
participación. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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broad, pluralistic view of political participation in a multicultural 
democracy. 
In contrast, consider the form of public participation included 
in the forestry law struck down by the Court’s decision, C-080.  By 
international standards, the Colombian forestry law’s participation 
provisions were up-to-date.  The law began with a commitment to 
economically productive and sustainable forest management.87  
Furthermore, the law went on to commit the nation to the 
protection and development of rural communities88 and to the 
study and sharing of traditional knowledge as “fundamental 
elements in the sustainable management of natural forests and the 
development of tree plantations.”89  Moreover, the law provided 
the following assurance:  “[t]he State guarantees the right of 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to make decisions 
freely, within the framework of the Constitution and the law, with 
respect to forestry activities of a sustainable character that they 
wish to apply in their territories.”90  The law also created a 
National Forestry Council comprised of state and private actors 
with forestry interests, as well as two representatives from each of 
the indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, in addition to a 
number of other seats for representatives of the non-profit 
environmental and sustainable development activist 
communities.91  Additionally, Article 19, in conformity with other 
laws protecting minority rights, contained a specific requirement 
for a prior consult, of at least 12 months in advance, with Afro-
Colombian and indigenous communities with respect to the 
“enjoyment, management, and use” of the forests.92
 
87 See Ley 1021 de 2006, abril 24, 2006 Diario Oficial [D.O.] 45.249, art. 2(1), 
(Colom.) (promising to prioritize the sustainable management of Colombia's 
forests while maintaining that any actions taken will be in line with international 
law).  
 
88 See id. art. 2(6) (detailing how the sustainable management plans will 
include a focus on maintaining and improving the living conditions for rural 
communities).  
89 Id. art. 2(7) (“[E]lementos fundamentales para el manejo sostenible de los 
bosques naturales y el desarrollo de plantaciones forestales.”).  
90 Id. art. 2(10) (“El Estado garantiza el derecho de las comunidades indígenas 
y afrocolombianas a la libre toma de decisiones, dentro del marco de la 
Constitución y la ley, respecto de las actividades forestales de carácter sostenible 
que desearen emprender en sus territorios . . . .”). 
91 Id. art. 7. 
92 Id. art. 19 (reiterating the focus on the protection of indigenous and rural 
communities in regards to the use or management of forests in their territories).  
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If the goal of public hearings is to involve possibly affected 
populations, the prior Colombian law was arguably much stronger 
than many U.S. and European examples.  In the U.S. context, there 
exists an over-reliance on “technical and scientific tools and 
norms” that fail to “recognize the complex social, political and 
ethical concerns embedded in many environmental and natural 
resource issues.”93  This can result from adherence to a “tightly 
structured and open public process” that nonetheless, “[i]n 
practice . . . is frequently manipulated into announce-and-defend 
decision-making, in which meaningful outside input [from the 
potentially most-affected communities] is effectively stillborn.”94  
In the European context, a possible preference in public 
participation for larger and well-financed environmental interest 
groups to the exclusion of smaller, community-based interest 
groups likely leads, it has been observed, to the “dangers of 
capture and exclusion.”95
Thus, the Colombian Constitutional Court’s rejection of the 
law’s relatively far-sighted public participation requirements is 
striking.  Perhaps even more significantly, the complaint 
demonstrated that neither the executive nor the legislative 
branches of government had observed even the most minimal 
public consultation before promulgating the forestry law, a serious 
error because the law affected indigenous and minority 
communities directly.
 
96
Fifth, Decision C-080’s significance extends to its consistent 
intertwining of social, environmental, and natural resource 
  Paradoxically, the elitist promulgation of 
the law, which ignored its basic requirements, resulted in a 
decision that puts in place an even more robust prior consult 
procedure that can be used to ensure an even more powerful voice 
for indigenous and ethnic minority Colombians. 
 
93  Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, in 
JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 139, 
141–42 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002).  
94 Id. at 143. 
95 JANE HOLDER & MARIA LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, LAW AND POLICY: 
TEXT AND MATERIALS 129 (2d ed. 2007).  
96 See Complaint, supra note 36. 
Se solicita a la honorable Corte Constitucional que se declare la 
inexequibilidad de la totalidad de la Ley 1021 de 2006, por no haberse 
realizado consulta previa a las comunidades indígenas ni a los pueblos 
afrodescendientes durante el proceso de construcción de la iniciativa 
legislativa que condujo a la expedición de la Ley 1021 de 2006. 
Id. § 1.2. 
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concerns.  For the Colombian Constitutional Court, minority 
interests are more than central to the protection of national 
resource interests; they are indivisible from them.97  The Court thus 
explained: “[t]he content of the general forestry law demonstrates 
an undeniable national interest, whose provisions affect, in a broad 
way, all Colombians, and in a specific way, a group of diverse 
sectors, who have a closer relation to forests and with forestry 
activities or are dependent on them.”98  Therefore, the law fails not 
just because it directly and negatively affected the autonomy of 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, but also because its 
application “could have repercussions over the forms of life in and 
over the close relationships that are maintained in the forest.”99
Sixth, Decision C-030 provides a normative road map for the 
benefits of advance and inclusive environmental planning.  It 
recognizes that short-term economic interests need to yield to long-
term environmental consequences.  For example, Decision C-030 
suggests that a reformulated prior consult process would result in 
decisions that reduce rates of forest extraction today and promote 
other long-term goals that matter both for economic and 
environmental sustainability (including water resource protection 
and land stabilization to prevent erosion).
  
Unlike the majority of U.S. environmental cases, which proceed 
from a premise in the negative of unequal environmental burdens, 
Decision C-030 advances a positive, inclusive vision of the benefits 
of applying environmental justice principles.  For the Colombian 
Constitutional Court in Decision C-080, protecting minority rights 
acts to defend the rights of all. 
100  In addition, the 
Decision understands biodiversity protection as bearing upon the 
continued healthy development of human societies as well as being 
a value in its own right.101
 
97 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, ¶ 5.3(a) (emphasizing that while the 
Forestry Act is important to all Colombians, it is of particular importance to 
industries and groups of people with close ties to the forest).  
  As the Court acknowledged, this is not 
a trivial matter in the Colombian case since the nation contains an 
98 Id.  
99 Id. ¶ 5.3(d). 
100 See Rômulo S.R. Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The Evolving 
Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism Ten 
Years After the Kyoto Protocol, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 675 (2008) (emphasizing 
the possibility of negative long-term consequences such as increased erosion and 
problems with water supply).  
101 See Sentencia C-030/08, supra note 11, art. 4, ¶¶ 3, 8, 13 (focusing on 
involving indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them). 
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estimated 14% of the world’s biodiversity, the world’s second 
highest number of species per land unit, and three times the 
number of avian species as in all of North America.102  Importantly, 
the Court acknowledged that forest protection plays a role in 
response to climate change, because forests are “carbon sinks.”103
Seventh, Decision C-080 implicitly makes the case that 
environmental, land use, and development policies need to be 
linked.  A failure to include affected communities in exploitation of 
the forests where they have flourished will have consequences 
including, most likely, immigration to larger urban centers for 
work.  Only by stemming urban migration can Colombia and other 
Latin American countries begin to reduce poverty and urban 
violence in cities ill-equipped to handle, and unable to 
productively employ, all of the new arrivals.
 
104
3. REFLECTIONS ON SECURING LAND USE AND                              
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 
As noted at the outset of this essay, environmental justice 
claims most typically focus on preventing harm to communities in 
the United States.105
 
102 Country Profiles Page—Colombia, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/countries/?country=co (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) 
(summarizing the components of biodiversity in Columbia’s ecological system).  
  Decision C-080 charts a different path, 
providing a more ample conception of environmental justice that 
understands individuals and communities as existing on land and 
within the environment with a central role to play in their 
protection.  In this way, Decision C-080 adopts the dominant U.S. 
view and demonstrates the extreme artificiality of the conception 
of environmental matters as federal, and land use questions as 
local. 
103 Sampaio, supra note 100, at 638 (detailing how forests can store large 
amounts of carbon, but become problematic when disturbed because this leads to 
forests releasing the carbon instead of retaining it).  See generally U.N. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: LAND USE, 
LAND USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/spm/srl-en.pdf (discussing the carbon 
cycle and how different forestry and land use practices affect standing carbon 
stocks and greenhouse emissions). 
104 Hernán Darío Correa, Ordenamiento Territorial, participación social y manejo 
de áreas protegidas en medio de la crisis humanitaria y el conflicto armado en Colombia, in 
REGIÓN, CIUDAD Y ÁREAS PROTEGIDAS: MANEJO AMBIENTAL PARTICIPATIVO 51, 61–64 
(Felipe Cárdenas Támara et al. eds., 2005).  
105 See RECHSTAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 1, at 329 (describing a program that 
provides data on every county in the United States and highlighting 
environmental justice implications). 
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In contrast to the view dominant in the United States, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court’s Decision C-080 provides a bio-
centric vision of environmental protection that understands human 
actors as one part of a more complex and dynamic system.  
Assuring justice in access to environmental benefits—what has 
been called here “positive” environmental justice—is thus a 
mechanism that does not merely defend individual or group rights 
for their own sake but also helps ensure the long-term 
sustainability and survivability of all people and all things.  
Decision C-080 does so with its repeated and emphatic linking of 
social and environmental concerns.  This is quite unlike, for 
example, the refusal to recognize the way human beings interact 
with and affect the environment in a noted decision like the 2006 
Rapanos case.  In that case, writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia 
advanced a view of the hydrological cycle’s functioning that no 
scientist would likely support.106
 
  By contrast, the Decision C-080’s 
nuanced and layered attention to human-environmental reactions 
and the consequences of thoughtless environmental and land use 
management is encouraging not only for its defense of minority 
community rights but also because, as has been suggested above, 
the Decision understands that minority rights deserve protection 
because in so doing one defends larger goals of social and 
environmental stability. 
 
106 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–34 (2006) (tying the Clean 
Water Act’s grant of jurisdiction to a dictionary definition of streams, rivers, 
oceans, and lakes, despite scientific evidence of the extensive interconnection over 
land and underground among water bodies).  
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